The Ghazi Attack: A Secret Battle That Shaped History

The year 1971 saw a critical conflict unfold, leading to the birth of a new nation. At the heart of this war was a secret naval battle, known as the Ghazi Attack. This incident played a major role in the India-Pakistan War, changing how the conflict ended. It involved a Pakistani submarine, PNS Ghazi, on a mission to destroy India's most powerful warship, INS Vikrant. India's clever plans and quick actions turned the tide. This is the story of that intense period, full of spy games, naval strategies, and daring decisions.

The 1971 Crisis: East Pakistan's Struggle

In 1971, Pakistan was split into two parts: West Pakistan and East Pakistan. The people in East Pakistan, which is now Bangladesh, felt treated unfairly by West Pakistan's leaders. They protested against language discrimination. On March 25, 1971, West Pakistan's military began a harsh crackdown in East Pakistan. This caused widespread killings.

Many people fled East Pakistan and crossed into India. Every day, over 50,000 refugees arrived. India had to build many refugee camps. Soon, more than 9 million refugees had entered India. This caused a huge financial strain. The Indian government faced a burden of 700 million dollars. About 4% of the central government's budget went to managing this crisis. The long border made it hard to stop the flow of refugees. India feared changes to its own population makeup.

India Decides to Intervene

India tried many ways to solve the problem, including talks at the United Nations. When nothing worked, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi met with the Army, Navy, and Air Force chiefs in April 1971. She asked them to take military action in East Pakistan. The chiefs initially refused. They said they needed time to prepare for a sure victory with fewer losses. After discussions, Indira Gandhi agreed to give them time. They planned for a war in December 1971.

The Indian forces used this preparation time wisely. Their goal was to weaken Pakistan before the December war. This would make victory easier.

Cutting Off Pakistan's Supply Lines

Pakistan's military had only two ways to get from West Pakistan to East Pakistan. One was by air, and the other was by sea. On April 1, 1971, India closed its airspace. This left only the sea route for Pakistan's military supplies.

S. M. Nanda, the head of the Indian Navy, wanted to block this sea route too. Cutting off weapon supplies would isolate East Pakistan. India could not directly stop the ships. This would be an act of war. So, a new plan was made for May 1971.

Operation X: A Secret Naval Strike

A secret location was chosen in Plassey, West Bengal, called C2P. Lieutenant Kapil and Lieutenant Das managed this camp. They trained members of the Mukti Bahini, who were fighting guerrilla warfare against Pakistan's military in East Pakistan.

The training taught them how to navigate at night, use small boats, and install magnetic limpet mines. These commandos would swim underwater at night. They would attach magnetic limpet mines to Pakistani ships. These mines would explode at a set time, destroying the ships. This plan would block the sea route without direct Indian involvement. It would stop Pakistan's military supply line to East Pakistan.

After training, a secret code was set. Two specific songs would play on Indian radio at a certain time. This signal would start Operation X.

The Attack Begins

On the night of August 15, 1971, the chosen songs played on the radio. As planned, Mukti Bahini commandos launched from Chittagong, Mongla, and Chandpur. They swam to Pakistani ships and attached magnetic limpet mines. The explosions began soon after.

On August 16, 1971, major losses hit Pakistan. The MV Al-Abbas and MV Hormuz both exploded. Almost 19,000 tons of arms and ammunition were destroyed. Pakistan was shocked. They did not understand how the explosions were happening. Over 100 vessels were blown up. Pakistan became afraid to send ships through this route. Captain M. N. R. Samant, who was part of the operation, confirmed these events in his book.

Pakistan soon realized these were not random guerrilla attacks. They saw it as a planned operation backed by India. The USA, which supported Pakistan, also started tracking India's actions. A CIA document from September 22, 1971, confirmed India's support for Mukti Bahini. This document is now declassified and found in the Records of Foreign Relations of the United States, document number 144.

Pakistan's Plan to Strike Back: PNS Ghazi

With ships blowing up and India's name involved, Pakistan went on the offensive. It moved its fighters and naval units to airbases near Karachi. India's Navy Headquarters received intelligence. It warned that Pakistan might seek revenge for Operation X. The Indian Navy became alert. They remembered the Pearl Harbor attack in World War II and feared a similar surprise strike.

India's most important aircraft carrier, INS Vikrant, was docked in Mumbai. It was a vital naval asset, like a moving airbase for fighter jets in the Indian Ocean. INS Vikrant could change the outcome of a war. Keeping it safe was extremely important.

INS Vikrant: A Crucial Asset

INS Vikrant still needed repairs. Its catapult launcher had a fault. Multiple water drums in its A-1 boiler also needed fixing. Spare parts from Britain would take years to arrive. There were debates about whether to keep Vikrant safe or deploy it for war.

S. M. Nanda, the Navy Chief, and Vice Admiral Hira Nandani insisted that Vikrant, India's most powerful weapon, must be in the war. They promised to make it ready. Their plan was approved. INS Vikrant was moved from Mumbai's Ballard Pier to Colaba Port for repairs. After that, it went to Kochi, then to Madras (now Chennai) in the Bay of Bengal. From there, it was tasked with surveillance over 18,000 square miles between Madras, Visakhapatnam, and Port Blair.

Pakistan's naval intelligence learned that INS Vikrant was on the East Coast. They became very worried. Airspace was closed, sea routes were unsafe due to Operation X, and now Vikrant was in the East. Pakistan feared a naval blockade by Vikrant. This would cut off all military control and supplies to East Pakistan. East Pakistan would be lost. Pakistan decided they had to destroy INS Vikrant.

PNS Ghazi: Pakistan's Lone Hope

Pakistan did not have an aircraft carrier. It had four submarines. Three of these, Hangor, Mangro, and Shushuk, were short-range. They could not reach INS Vikrant. But Pakistan's fourth submarine, PNS Ghazi, was long-range. It was the only one that could attack Vikrant.

PNS Ghazi was hard to detect underwater. It was an old submarine, originally the USS Diablo from the US. In 1961, India got INS Vikrant. To counter this, the US leased USS Diablo to Pakistan in 1963 under a Security Assistance Program. Pakistan renamed it PNS Ghazi S-130.

By September 1971, Pakistan's leaders decided to send PNS Ghazi to the Bay of Bengal to destroy INS Vikrant. However, Ghazi was in bad shape. It was old, and its Mark 14 torpedoes had technical problems. It had just been called back from a patrol due to mechanical issues. Pakistan's Navy did not want to send it. But the leadership pushed ahead with preparations.

The Hunt for the Vikrant Begins

Pakistan knew INS Vikrant was in the Bay of Bengal but not its exact spot. A Western country's aircraft was sent to Madras. It claimed an emergency landing due to "technical problems." India allowed it. During "repairs," the aircraft made test drives. It spotted INS Vikrant, took photos, and got its coordinates. This confidential information went to Captain Abdul Wahil Bhumbal, Pakistan's Director of Naval Warfare. The Western country was never officially named.

On November 8, 1971, Captain Zafar Muhammad Khan was chosen to command PNS Ghazi. He had been Ghazi's torpedo officer in the 1965 war. He received basic details about INS Vikrant.

A week later, on November 14, 1971, PNS Ghazi was set to depart. Captain Zafar, with 93 crew members and 11 officers, prepared to leave. They did not know the mission's exact details. Naval Headquarters gave them sealed orders. They were to open these orders at a specific location or if communication broke.

PNS Ghazi left, turning right. It kept 400 nautical miles from India's border. It moved at 20 knots per hour to avoid detection. The crew had no idea what lay ahead.

India Tracks Ghazi

The Indian Navy tracked communication signals from Karachi, Lahore, Rawalpindi, and Dhaka. India did not have advanced computers. But it had a smart radio direction finder. It could not fully decode Pakistan's messages. But it could tell where signals were coming from.

PNS Ghazi sent small, encrypted messages to Pakistan's Naval Headquarters. It updated its position and status. India's radio direction finder saw a pattern. A submarine was slowly moving southeast towards INS Vikrant's position. It sent short signals to Pakistan regularly.

C.O. Dharam Dev Dutta, known as "DDD," investigated. He found that West and East Pakistan had suddenly increased secret messages. He also intercepted a wireless message. It requested a special lubricant oil from Chattogram in East Pakistan. This oil was only used in minesweepers and submarines. All signs pointed to Ghazi. India had records of Ghazi's frequency and operating habits. They matched. C.O. Dharam Dev Dutta confirmed that PNS Ghazi was moving to destroy INS Vikrant.

India also learned that Pakistan was installing a new surveillance system at Karachi Port. During wartime, new enemy equipment can change everything. India needed to know what it was. Indian Customs caught an Indian doctor named Cowasji smuggling goods. R&AW made a deal with him. He was to take two RAW agents, code-named ROD and Moriarty, to Pakistan by ship. The agents took photos and counted ships. They saw an anti-aircraft battery and radar system. These are only seen during emergencies or war. This intel confirmed Pakistan's decision for war. PNS Ghazi's mission against Vikrant would be the trigger.

Ghazi's Journey and Secret Orders

PNS Ghazi crossed Okha Port on November 16, 1971, sending its coordinates to Pakistan. It then headed to Colombo, passing Goa, Karnataka, and Mangalore Port. On November 18, 1971, it reached Kochi Port in Kerala. The next day, November 19, it arrived at Trincomalee Port in Sri Lanka. It refueled and cleaned. It had covered 2,200 nautical miles.

Commander Zafar opened his sealed orders. One letter said, "Open at High Seas." The orders had two tasks:

1. Go to Madras and sink INS Vikrant.
2. If Vikrant could not be sunk, lay mines near Visakhapatnam Port.

The second task was revenge for the ships destroyed by Operation X. Commander Zafar understood his mission was to sink INS Vikrant. He slowly moved towards Vikrant's likely location.

The Decoy and the Final Trap

Indian intelligence knew PNS Ghazi was in the Bay of Bengal. Ghazi used short, encrypted messages (Short HF Bursts) to talk to Pakistan Headquarters. India found it hard to intercept these. So, whenever Ghazi transmitted, India sent strong background signals on that frequency. This made Ghazi's communication hard to understand. Messages had to be repeated, giving India more time to track Ghazi's general area. But its exact location remained unknown.

On November 28, 1971, Ghazi left Sri Lanka to sink INS Vikrant. After two days, on November 22, 1971, it reached waters near Madras. It began searching for INS Vikrant.

Vikrant Moves, Ghazi Follows

India's Eastern Naval Command had trained local fishermen. They learned to spot oil leaks, periscopes, or other signs of submarine activity. They reported anything unusual to naval outposts. Near Madras, fishermen reported signs of a large submarine. This intel, with transmission data, confirmed Ghazi was near Madras Port.

Vice Admiral N. Krishnan saw this as an alarm. He decided to move INS Vikrant from Madras Port. They considered moving it to Visakhapatnam. But they realized Ghazi would likely follow. There was no guarantee of safety. A new decision was made.

INS Vikrant moved to a secret location near the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, codenamed Port X-Ray. This was an uninhabited area with clear waters. It was close to the Bay of Bengal, making it easy to bring Vikrant back for combat. The clear water would also make it easier to spot and destroy a submarine like Ghazi.

While Vikrant moved, Ghazi stayed near Madras Port, about 12-15 miles away. It kept coordinating with Pakistan's Naval Headquarters. Pakistan's spies on the ground sent small bits of information to Ghazi using secret codes.

Krishnan's Deception at Visakhapatnam

Vice Admiral N. Krishnan wanted PNS Ghazi to move from Madras towards Visakhapatnam. Visakhapatnam Port was an Indian Navy stronghold with excellent technical capabilities. It had sonar systems, hydrophones, and anti-submarine warfare equipment. Its geography offered limited escape routes for Ghazi. Destroying Ghazi there would be easier.

N. Krishnan devised a plan. He used lightly encrypted radio communications. These were easy enough for Pakistan to crack. The messages suggested INS Vikrant was near Visakhapatnam Port.

He did another clever thing. Large orders for vegetables and supplies were placed at Visakhapatnam Port. Big ships like INS Vikrant need massive food storage. The huge supply orders made it seem like Vikrant was arriving. Local Pakistani informants heard this and passed the intel to Pakistan.

This deception worked. On November 25, 1971, Pakistan's Naval Headquarters received the false intel. That night, at 11:07 PM, they sent a secret message to PNS Ghazi: "Occupy zone victory with full dispatch. Intelligence indicates: carrier in port."

Captain Zafar immediately set course from Madras to Visakhapatnam Port, about 340 miles away. This time, Ghazi maintained complete radio silence. The crew knew Visakhapatnam Port was heavily monitored. Transmitting signals would mean detection. Ghazi disappeared from India's radar.

Ghazi's Fate at Visakhapatnam

By November 27, 1971, around 10 PM, PNS Ghazi reached Visakhapatnam Port. It began searching for INS Vikrant. India's command was tense. They had lost track of Ghazi. General Jacob, head of the Eastern Command, worried Ghazi might have found Port X-Ray.

Visakhapatnam Port is divided into an inner harbor and an outer harbor. Large stone walls, called breakwaters, protect it. There is only one main entry and exit point for large ships. PNS Ghazi reached near this entrance.

Captain Zafar had three choices:

1. Search the inner harbor for INS Vikrant. This was too risky. The inner harbor was only 15 meters deep. Ghazi would be easily detected. It could not go more than 2.1 nautical miles inside.
2. Wait outside the outer harbor and fire a torpedo at INS Vikrant when it appeared.
3. Plant mines along the entry and exit path between the breakwaters.

Captain Zafar decided to lay mines at the entrance of Visakhapatnam Port. One team kept watch through the periscope for INS Vikrant. The mines were designed to detonate after a certain number of ships passed, ensuring the target ship (like Vikrant) was hit. Captain Zafar set the counter to 20.

On November 28, 1971, Captain Zafar began planting mines near the outer harbor. Each mine was 150 meters apart, at a depth of about 30 meters. It took 30 to 50 minutes to set one mine. The first was ready in about 40 minutes. As they set the second, the periscope team spotted a ship. They thought it was INS Vikrant, but it was INS Magar, coming for repairs.

PNS Ghazi tried to finish placing the second mine before INS Magar got close. They failed. In an emergency, Ghazi dived sharply to the left to avoid a crash. The 2,400-ton submarine lost balance and hit the seabed hard. Ghazi got stuck. Metal tore off and floated away. The shock dislodged its torpedo tubes. The crew feared the weapons could fire on their own. Ghazi was trapped at coordinates 17° 40.8′ N, 83° 21′ E. Only one mine was placed. The second remained unfinished.

For the next three days (November 28, 29, and 30), Pakistan's Naval Headquarters could not contact Ghazi. Its logbooks later confirmed it was stuck but active. Pakistan faced a major crisis. Airspace was closed, sea routes were threatened by Operation X, and Ghazi was missing. Pakistan began to believe Ghazi had sunk. They took no further action. East Pakistan was almost completely cut off.

The Decoy Mission of INS Rajput

Pakistan decided to declare war on India on December 3, 1971. Two days before, on December 1, 1971, a secret message went to East Pakistan. It told all merchant ships and aircraft to stay away from the Bay of Bengal. Indian intelligence intercepted this message. India knew an attack was coming.

INS Vikrant was crucial for the war. India had to bring it back from Port X-Ray into the Bay of Bengal. But the Indian Navy still did not know Ghazi's exact status or location. They believed Ghazi was hiding in the Bay, waiting for Vikrant.

To protect Vikrant, an old destroyer ship, INS Rajput, was used. It was stationed at Visakhapatnam and soon to be retired. This was the old INS Rajput from Britain, acquired in 1949.

Vice Admiral N. Krishnan made a plan. INS Rajput would sail first as a decoy. Ghazi would mistake it for INS Vikrant. The attack meant for Vikrant would hit Rajput instead. This was a deadly mission for INS Rajput.

Captain Inder Singh of INS Rajput was told the plan. He learned Ghazi was trying to destroy INS Vikrant. If Vikrant was hit, it would greatly impact the war and Indian Navy morale. Captain Inder Singh did not hesitate. He said, "Whether I come back or not, INS Rajput will surely come back." His team prepared for the mission without question.

On December 2, 1971, INS Rajput left Visakhapatnam Port. It sailed toward Madras as a decoy for INS Vikrant. Its signals were kept high. Fake radio communications were made, announcing Vikrant's arrival in Madras. Even Captain Duckworth, the Naval Officer-in-Charge of Madras Port, was openly told by N. Krishnan to prepare a dock for INS Vikrant. Captain Duckworth was shocked by this seemingly careless message.

INS Rajput patrolled the route for a long time with its signals on. Nothing happened.

Ghazi's Final Moments

Earlier, when Ghazi hit the seabed, some metal parts broke off. Fishermen, trained by the Indian Navy, found these parts. They gave them to the Navy. N. Krishnan examined them and found they belonged to PNS Ghazi. He thought Ghazi had sunk and Vikrant was safe. He ordered INS Rajput to return.

December 3, 1971, arrived. INS Vikrant was in the Bay of Bengal. Both India and Pakistan believed PNS Ghazi had sunk. But Ghazi was still stuck near Visakhapatnam Port. Its captain and crew were alive.

On that same day, December 3, 1971, Pakistan started the war. They attacked over eight Indian airfields. The Indian Navy sent its eastern fleet, including INS Vikrant, towards East Pakistan.

Meanwhile, INS Rajput returned to Visakhapatnam Port. At 11:40 PM, as Rajput neared the port where Ghazi was stuck, its sonar detected a vibration. It came from Ghazi, which was trying to surface.

The INS Rajput team took no risks during wartime. Captain Inder Singh ordered two depth charges to be fired at the vibration's location. A huge explosion followed. People in nearby houses felt a small earthquake. Heavy vibrations shook the sea. Ghazi's dislodged torpedo tubes fired on their own, making a loud noise. The area went silent. Captain Inder Singh sent details to N. Krishnan and moved on.

The next morning, local fishermen found metal parts and life jackets in the same area. The life jackets had "USS Diablo" written on them, Ghazi's original name. On December 4, 1971, at 12:15 AM, INS Akshay and the Command Clearance Diving Team were sent to the location where INS Rajput had fired. They had photos of PNS Ghazi. They dived and matched the submarine below. On December 5, 1971, at 9:14 AM, they confirmed the sunken submarine was PNS Ghazi at 17 degrees 40.8 minutes North and 83 degrees 21 minutes East.

Teams analyzed Ghazi. They found dead bodies, Ghazi's Hydrographic Correction Book, and its logbook. A clock had stopped at 12:15 AM, the exact time INS Rajput fired. Communications and secret codes between Ghazi and Pakistan Naval Headquarters were found. All this data was sent to the Indian Navy Headquarters for analysis.

The Aftermath and a New Nation

India's Defence Minister informed Parliament about what happened with Ghazi. The destruction of PNS Ghazi was a crucial event in the 1971 war. INS Vikrant played a huge role in the conflict. As a result, 93,000 Pakistani soldiers surrendered, the largest surrender since World War II. Pakistan was divided, and East Pakistan became the independent nation of Bangladesh.